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CHAPTER 8 
Conflict of Laws 
JEAN E. DE VALPINE 
§8.1. Co-guaranty: Equitable duty of contribution. In Nissenberg 
v. Felleman,1 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that 
an equitable co-guarantor relationship, not directly based upon a guar-
anty agreement but rising out of it, is governed by New York law, the 
guaranty agreement and related loan agreement being made and por-
tending performance in New York, at least when the guaranty agree-
ment broadly stipulates New York law as governing the rights and 
obligations of the parties. The Massachusetts forum then afforded the 
plaintiff co-guarantors recourse to equitable exoneration as against the 
defendant co-guarantors, a "remedy" in excess of the equitable rights 
of co-guarantors to contribution as defined under the controlling sub-
stantive law of New York. 
The Nissenberg case was an equity suit. Both the plaintiffs and the 
defendants, physical persons, were joint and several co-guarantors, 
under a written guaranty agreement between themselves on one side 
and Y corporation on the other side, of loan payment obligations due 
from the debtor X corporation to the creditor Y corporation under a 
written loan agreement. X corporation was a Massachusetts corpora-
tion and Y corporation was a New York corporation. New York was 
determined by the Court to be the place of making and intended per-
formance of both agreements.2 The plaintiffs and the defendants, resi-
dents of Massachusetts, collectively comprised the directors, officers, and 
stockholders of X corporation. 
The loan agreement provided that "this agreement and all trans-
actions, assignments and transfers hereunder, and all rights of the 
parties, shall be governed as to validity, construction, enforcement, and 
in all other respects by the laws of ... New York." The guaranty 
agreement provided: "This guaranty, all acts and transactions here-
under, and the rights and obligations of the parties hereto, shall be 
governed, construed and interpreted according to the laws of ... New 
York." 3 
JEAN E. DE VALPINE is a member of the firm of Powers, Hall, Montgomery and 
Weston, Boston. 
§8.1. 1339 Mass. 717, 162 N.E.2d 304 (1959). 
2 This resulted from orthodox application of relevant conflicts rules and hence 
is not specially reviewed herein. 339 Mass. at 717, 719, 162 N.E.2d at 306. 
3339 Mass. at 717 n.l, 162 N.E.2d at 306 n.l. 
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After the commencement of separate suit in Massachusetts by the 
New York creditor against the plaintiffs, alleging failure of the debtor 
X corporation to pay sums due under the loan agreement and seeking 
satisfaction from the plaintiffs as co-guarantors under the guaranty 
agreement, but prior to ajudication in such suit, the plaintiffs sought 
by this bill in equity against their co-guarantors, the defendants, (1) a 
decree that the defendants "are jointly and severally liable for one half 
of the obligation which the plaintiffs ... may be required to pay" and 
(2) an order that the defendants pay to the creditor one-half of any 
judgment that the creditor may recover against the plaintiffs. The 
defendants' demurrer was sustained in the lower court and a final de-
cree dismissing the bill was entered. 
The Supreme Judicial Court treated the case as capable of decision 
in two phases: (a) determination of the jural relationship between the 
co-guarantors; and (b) determination of remedies, if any, available to 
give effect to the right-duty correlatives of that relationship. The diffi-
culty is that (a) may swallow (b). Right and remedy are frequently 
equivalent, mutually reflexive implications from the same jural rela-
tionship. Certain entire jural relationships resist breakdown into two 
concrete component parts consisting of a "substantive" right-duty as-
pect as distinct from a "procedural" or "remedial" aspect. It is not 
surprising that this is particularly true of relationships of equitable 
origin, in view of equity's historical propensity to think and act in 
remedial terms. 
Treating right and remedy as separable, the Court first chose the 
law establishing the extent of equitable duty of contribution among co-
guarantors. In this phase of its decision the Court contributed an in-
crement of new precedent to the underdeveloped methodology of 
choice of law in the field of equitable relationships. 
Cognizant of the traditional view that this equitable duty of co-guar-
antors does not constitute a contractual duty based directly upon the 
guaranty agreement, but rather is an "implied" duty inhering in the 
co-guarantor relationship, the Court was well aware that determination 
on the substantive law of the guaranty contract does not necessarily 
compel choice of the same law as governing the right-duty substance of 
the co-guarantor relationship. Indeed, given the nexus that the co-
guarantors are all of Massachusetts, as is the debtor, and the concept 
that the co-guarantor relationship is strictly equitable and interper-
sonal, it seems plausible a priori to choose Massachusetts as the source 
of the applicable substantive law. The Court, however, chose New 
York law as the controlling substantive law of the co-guarantor rela-
tionship, on the rationale that this relationship, albeit generative of 
rights and duties premised in equity and not in contract, arose out of 
execution and delivery of a guaranty agreement incontrovertibly gov-
erned by New York law and in consequence was to be governed by the 
same law, at least when the parties have stipulated that law as the law 
of the agreement itself "in such broad language." 4 
4339 Mass. at 720, 162 N.E.2d at 307. 
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That this phase of the Nissenberg decision breaks new ground in 
Massachusetts and constitutes an addition to a very sparse body of 
Anglo-American and Civil Law authority and commentary is attested 
by the absence in the opinion of supporting citations and a footnote 
reference to "the varying views governing implied obligations." Ii 
Examination of the material thus footnoted by the Court reveals, how-
ever, that the "implied obligations" over which views are said to vary 
are mainly of the simple quasi-contractual, unjust enrichment variety 
and are distinguishable from the "implied obligation, equitable in 
character, growing out of the relationship of co-surety or co-guar-
antor," 6 that confronted the Court. 
More apposite discussion than that found in the sections of Rabel 
cited by the Court is to be found in another section of Rabel, advanc-
ing as not necessary, but convenient, the position of the German Su-
preme Court, consistent with the Nissenberg result, "to the effect that 
when the co-sureties are bound under one law to the creditor, they are 
presumed to be bound under the same law as to contribution among 
themselves," 7 and noting as consonant with this view a number of 
Anglo-American cases.8 
The second interesting conflicts aspect of Nissenberg lies in the 
action of the forum Court in extending to the plaintiff co-guarantors 
equitable remedies that the Court frankly recognized may exceed in 
scope remedies available under New York law, the law chosen as gov-
erning the right-duty relationship of the co-guarantors. The Court 
followed the formula, (I) that the forum determines what is procedure 
and what is substance, and (2) that equitable remedies as between co-
guarantors are matters of procedure. The difficulty is in the under-
lying premise upon which the Court based its approach to the entire 
case, namely, that the substantive obligations of the parties as deter-
mined under New York law subsist sufficiently separable from remedies 
so that Massachusetts can apply its own remedies without disturbing 
the content of the substantive obligations. 
The Court stated the substantive New York law as follows: "The 
right to contribution from co-guarantors arises in New York when a 
co-guarantor who is 'legally liable upon his guaranty' has 'paid the 
claim' of the creditor ... , 'Then, and not until such payment, has he 
the right to exact contributions.''' 9 The Court expressed doubt 
whether in any event a New York court would grant conditional relief 
I) Ibid. As indicative of "varying views," the Court refers to American Union 
Bank v. Swiss Bank Corp., 40 F.2d 446, 450 (2d Cir. 1930); Restatement of Conflict 
of Laws §§452·453; 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws §452.l (1935); Dicey, Conflict of Laws 
754-757 (6th ed. 1949); 3 Rabel, Conflict of Laws 361-382 (1950); Stumberg, Con-
flict of Laws 245 (2d ed. 1951). Cf. Wilson & Co. v. Douredoure, 154 F.2d 442, 444 
(3d Cir. 1946). 
6339 Mass. 717, 719,162 N.E.2d 304, 306 (1959). 
73 Rabel, Conflict of Laws 357-359, especially 358 (1950). 
8 Alexandria, Arcadia & Fort Smith R.R. v. Johnson, 61 Kan. 417, 59 Pac. 1063 
(1900); Fox v. Corry, 149 La. 445, 89 So. 410 (1921); Scandinavian American National 
Bank v. Kneeland, 24 Man. R. 168, 16 D.L.R. 565 (1914). 
9339 Mass. 717,720,162 N.E.2d 304,307 (1959). 
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by way of equitable exoneration to the plaintiffs in advance of payment 
by the plaintiffs of more than their share of the debt. But, in guise of 
remedy, as distinct from right, the Court accorded the plaintiffs the 
opportunity to amend their equity bill to qualify, on adequate proof, 
for equitable exoneration entailing specific performance by simultane-
ous payment by all co-guarantors. 
It seems, at least, that the New York "right to contribution" as stated 
by the Supreme Judicial Court, requires reformulation in retrospect of 
the Massachusetts remedy entailing equitable exoneration. Can it be 
that "equitable contribution" is the name of a "right," but "equitable 
exoneration" is the name of a "remedy"? Query whether the con-
ceptual difficulty arises in part from the fact that the so-called "right to 
contribution" itself originated as an equitable remedy. 
By way of peripheral comment, the Nissenberg case can be con-
sidered in view of the Restatement rule that "If a judgment in an 
action provided by the law of the forum would impose on the defend-
ant a more onerous duty than that imposed by the law of the state 
which created the right, or a substantially different duty, no action can 
be maintained." 10 
§8.2. Miscellaneous cases. The five decisions briefly noted in this 
section neither significantly augment nor disturb the existing texture of 
the conflicts jurisprudence of Massachusetts. 
In Weir v. New York, New Haven, &- Hartford R.R.,1 a Connecticut 
statute required that a railroad engine sound a bell or whistle within 
eighty rods of approach to a public crossing. It is not clear whether 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court perceived this statute, as 
applied by Connecticut courts, either (1) as establishing a definitive 
standard of care (as opposed to a "rule of ordinary care," as applied by 
the forum) binding on the forum, thereby reducing the scope of appli-
cable forum law to the purely probative and evidentiary domain, that 
is, the quantum of evidence necessary to prove facts and'the inferences 
permissible from such facts to reach a finding of negligence by reason 
of failure to meet such standard of care of the locus; or (2) as simply in 
accord with the forum's own norm of ordinary care so that due proof 
of violation of the statute is sufficient to permit a finding of negligence 
by reason of failure to meet the forum's norm. 
In Franklin Foundation v. Attorney General2 absence of argument as 
to possible relevance of the law of Pennsylvania, the domicile at death 
of the testator whose will created the subject charitable trust, enabled 
the forum court to apply its own law, bypassing a cluster of vexing 
questions as to what aspects of trust termination are substantive, and as 
such governed by the creation locus, and what are administrative, and 
as such governed by the administration locus. The case is set in a con-
text of contemplation by the Pennsylvania testator of long-term admin-
10 Restatement of Conflict of Laws §609. Cf. Erickson v. Nesmith, 4 Allen 233 
(Mass. 1862); Erickson v. Nesmith, 15 Gray 221 (Mass. 1860). 
§8.2. 1340 Mass. 66, 162 N.E.2d 793 (1959). 
2340 Mass. 197, 163 N.E.2d 662 (1960). 
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istration in Massachusetts with Massachusetts political officers serving 
as part of the administrative body of the trust and a Massachusetts 
political body having the remainder interest. One may speculate that 
at least in such a context, all questions affecting the trust (whether 
"substantive," "procedural," or "administrative"), perhaps excepting 
the threshold question of basic validity, may fall within the purview 
of the law of the administration locus. 
In West Side Motor Express, Inc. v. Finance Discount Corp.,3 the 
general rule that the law of the place of making governs the validity 
of a contract, was routinely applied to sustain a contract challenged as 
usurious under Connecticut law. Obiter dicta possibly adumbrated 
treatment of usury and like contract vitiation issues by application, 
given facts having sufficient nexus with several jurisdictions, of the law 
of the jurisdiction favoring validity, whether or not it be the contract-
making jurisdiction. 
In Tsacoyeanes v. Canadian Pacific Ry.4 the Massachusetts forum 
iterated, in an action of tort for injuries sustained by the plaintiff pas-
senger on the defendant's train by reason of jolts occurring at a To-
ronto terminal, the established rule that the substantive law of the 
jurisdiction in which the accident happens determines tort liability. 
In the absence of invocation of Ontario law by counsel for the parties, 
the Supreme Judicial Court declined to take judicial notice of Ontario 
law, noting, however, that counsel apparently tried the case upon the 
theory that relevant Ontario law was the same as the forum law. 
In Eisel v. Columbia Packing CO.5 the Federal District Court rou-
tinely applied the conflicts rule that the law of the forum furnishes the 
substantive doctrine determinative of the issue of collateral estoppel. 
31960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 537, 165 N.E.2d 903. 
4339 Mass. 726,162 N.E.2d 23 (1959). 
I) 181 F. Supp. 298 (D. Mass. 1960). The collateral estoppel-res judicata aspects 
of this case are discussed in Chapter 20. 
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